The initial incentive for this paper was the debt crisis in the periphery of the Eurozone and especially in Greece with disastrous results. La Década Perdida in Latin America in the 1980s had similarities and lessons to be learnt.
The system of public credit, i.e. of national debts, the origins of which are to be found in Genoa and Venice as early as the Middle Ages, took possession of Europe as a whole during the period of manufacture. The colonial system, with its maritime trade and its commercial wars, served as a forcing-house for the credit system. Thus it first took root in Holland. The national debt, i.e. the alienation of the state -whether that state is despotic, constitutional or republican -marked the capitalist era with its stamp. The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possession of a modern nation isthe national debt. Hence, quite consistently with this, the modem doctrine that a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in debt. Public credit becomes the credo of capital. And with the rise of national debt-making, lack of faith in the national debt takes the place of the sin against the Holy Ghost, for which there is no forgiveness. The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke of an enchanter's wand, it endows unproductive money with the power of creation and thus turns it into capital, without forcing it to expose itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury. The state's creditors actually give nothing away, for the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands just as so much hard cash would. At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles were only associations of private speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments and, thanks to the privilege they received, were in a position to advance money to those governments. Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infallible measure than the successive rise in the stocks of these banks, whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. The Bank of England began by lending its money to the government at 8 per cent; at the same time it was empowered by Parliament to coin money out of the same capital, by lending it a second time to the public in the form of banknotes. It was allowed to use these notes for discounting bills, making advances on commodities and buying the precious metals. It was not long before this credit-money, created by the bank itself, became the coin in which the latter made its loans to the state, and paid, on behalf of the state, the interest on the public debt. It was not enough that the bank gave with one hand and took back more with the other; it remained, even while receiving money, the eternal creditor of the nation down to the last farthing advanced. 3 What makes, however, debt or credit, public? There are historical accounts of institutions similar to modern public credit that concern debt assumed by collectivities such as monasteries or the finances of kings and princes during the era of mercantilism. 4 The first analyses of public debt formed part of the Tory-Whig propaganda war after the English Financial Revolution.
Daniel Defoe in an anonymous pamphlet written in 1710 at the behest of Robert
Harley -to whom sometimes it is erroneously attributed -tries to fathom the ontology of public credit in philosophical terms:
Like the Soul in the Body, it acts all Substance, yet is it self Immaterial; it gives Motion, yet it self cannot be said to Exist; it creates Forms, yet has it self no Form; it is neither Quantity or Quality; it has no Whereness, or Whenness, Scite, or Habit. If I should say it is the essential Shadow of something that is Not; should I not Puzzle the thing rather than Explain it, and leave you and my self more the Dark than we were before? (1710, p. 6) He describes, however, two basic characteristics of public credit: First, the fact that is public, i.e., national, and that it resides in the Queen and Parliament:
CREDIT is not the Effect of this or that Wheel in the Government, moving regular and just to its proper Work; but of the whole Movement, acting by the Force of its true original Motion, according to the exquisite Design of the Director of the whole Frame.
Thus the Honour, the Probity, the exact, punctual Management, which has raised our Credit to the pitch it is now arriv'd at, has not been merely the Great Wheel in the Nations Clockwork, that turn'd about the Treasure, but the Great Spring that turn'd about that Wheel, and this is the QUEEN and PARLIAMENT (1710, pp. 16-17) .
Secondly, this being the foundation of public credit its continuity must be assured. A number of other issues are also related to public credit: The openness and the publicity of the amount of public debt have been discussed early on. Necker's 1781
Comptes rendu au roi has been the acknowledgement that sound public finance cannot be a state secret (p. 3). The British notion of the budget was the model on which such accounts were based. Isaac de Pinto, a shrewd financier had pointed that out in his 1771 Treatise (p. 172) (see Grenier 2006, p. 6) . The willingness of investors to acquire public debt and the rate of return which they were willing to accept depended upon their estimates on the default risk and this in turn depended upon the size of the existing (past) debt and the revenues of the state. Going public on this matter became necessary. The calculation of this risk was fraught with difficulties arising from the inherent uncertainties of these instruments and the probable assumption of more debt by the state if things did not go as expected in war. The democratization of public debt had added volatility to these estimates and made the management of expectations regarding public debt more necessary. The issue of trust -hence the honesty and probity -of the government became paramount, lest investors were lured into a trap that would have been lucrative ex ante, but disastrous ex post. Debts, 1929, op. cit., pp. 13-19. Charles Davenant, the foremost political arithmeticians of his time after the death of Sir William Petty, was less mystified than Defoe. Writing at the end of the 17 th century, he saw public debt incurred to finance war as part of the logistics of the war effort. In the same way that Fabius Maximus (cunctator) defeated Hannibal by correcting anticipating that logistics was on his side, so Britain could defeat France by creating a sinking fund that could scare Louis XIV away. This, however, could only happen if the fundamentals -in today's parlance -were correct. If Louis saw that the creation of such a fund would be beyond the means of the nation creating it would have no effect. On the other hand, since taxes to finance extraordinary expenses were too high, a public loan would be the best way to dissipate the impact of these taxes.
Maybe there would be more room to borrow more. There is, however, an end to these possibilities. Interest and repayment had to be financed through future taxes and this could create public outrage. (1698, 1701).
Of those who saw in public debt as beneficial to the economy was Jean-François Melon (1675 Melon ( -1738 9 On the hands metaphor see also Charles Davenant, 1701, pp. 29-30. fertil Countries, where the want of sufficient Circulation, leaves the Inhabitants in continual Misery‖. This is the view that a large public debt goes together with opulence. Melon, however, stops short of the idea that the size of public debt can be unlimited. Oddly enough, more than two centuries later, in the 1960s one of the most fiscal conservatives, James Buchanan, will make the same remark, namely that a large public debt is a sign that a state's economy is strong, even though he is quick in pointing out that the reverse does not happen: an increase in public debt does not imply a stronger economy. Hume believes that at some point the gradual increase of debt will increasingly mortgage the existing taxes and it will lead to devise even more onerous taxes. This eventually will lead to default, which would have destroyed bondholders in favour of citizens. But in fact those who would decide upon such a default would prefer to benefit the bond holders instead of the citizens. Eventually -It must, indeed, be one of these two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation. 'Tis impossible they can both subsist, after the manner they have been hitherto manag'd, in this, as well as in some other nations‖ (p. 135).
Indeed, Hume's hostility towards public debt is expressed with extreme vehemence in the following footnote in his History of England written at the end of his life in which he compares the Crusades to Public Debt:
For, I suppose, there is no mathematical, still less an arithmetical demonstration, that the road to the Holy Land was not the road to Paradise, as there is, that the endless encrease of national debts is the direct road to national ruin. But having now compleatly reached that goal, it is needless at present to reflect on the past. It will be found in the present year, 1776, that all the revenues of this island, north of Trent and west of Reading, are mortgaged or anticipated for ever. Could the small remainder be in a worse condition, were those provinces seized by Austria and Prussia? There is only this difference, that some event might happen in Europe, which would oblige these great monarchs to disgorge their acquisitions. But no imagination can figure a situation, which will induce our creditors to relinquish their claims, or the public to seize their revenues. So egregious indeed has been our folly, that we have even lost all title to compassion, in the numberless calamities that are waiting us. states that -A national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing. It will be a powerful cement of our Union. It will also create a necessity for keeping up taxation to a degree which, without being oppressive, will be' a spur to industry, remote as we are from Europe, and shall be from danger. It were other wise to be feared our popular maxims would incline us to too great parsimony and Trace the progress of a public debt in a particular case. The government borrows of an individual one hundred dollars in specie, for which it gives its funded bonds. These hundred dollars are expended on some branch of the public service. It is evident they are not annihilated; they only pass from the individual who lent, to the individual or individuals to whom the government has disbursed them. They continue, in the hands of their new masters, to perform their usual functions, as capital. But besides this, the lender has the bonds of the government for the sum lent. These from their negotiable and easily vendible nature, can at any moment be applied by him to any useful or profitable undertaking which occurs; and thus the credit of the government produces a new and additional capital, equal to one hundred dollars, which, with the equivalent for the interest on that sum, temporarily diverted from other employments while passing into and out of the public coffers, continues its instrumentality as a capital, while it remains not re-imbursed.
On Hamilton, vol. 1, New York, John F. Trow, 1850, 223-257, at comes from capital that has not been invested in productive uses, in which case the impact on productivity is smaller. In the case of loans, lenders are not burdened since they can loan their capital and at the same time they hold assets that are liquid. The real stock of the economy is, however, given and the extra capital in the hands of the lenders makes it possible to channel productive capital into non-productive uses.
Smith is mindful of the creation of a fund financed by taxes in peace time that can be used at a time of war, since he does not trust the governments to put it into good use.
On the other hand, he thinks that the ease with which governments can borrow money and transfer the burden to future generations combined with the difficulty of imposing new taxes may eventually lead to economic disaster and inability to service the debt which will lead either to devaluation of the currency or to bankruptcy. The taxes that the government will have to impose either to repay or service the debt -in the case of perpetuities -will fall either on the landlords who will not be able to spend the necessary amounts to maintain and improve the productive structures of agriculture, or on the capitalists who will see the returns on their capital to fall and who will transfer their activities abroad. Smith writes with infinite contempt about the nonproductive bondholders and especially the French tax farmers who consumed by greed and conceit remain single since they will not marry women from their station, while honest women from the upper class despise them (1776/1976, V.III. §36 p. 919). Here it is sufficient to say that the prophets of evil were under a double delusion. They erroneously imagined that there was an exact analogy between the case of an individual who is in debt to another individual and the case of a society which is in debt to a part of itself; and this analogy led them into endless mistakes about the effect of the system of funding. They were under an error not less serious touching the resources of the country. They made no allowance for the effect produced by the incessant progress of every experimental science, and by the incessant efforts of every man to get on in life. They saw that the debt grew; and they forgot that other things grew as well as the debt.
The debate on public debt is kept alive with those who support the creation of public debt to face the resistance of classical economists. The debate is of course not without an economic stake. Lenders of the State, the financial system with its secondary markets had a lot to gain from the process, while politicians could finance wars without imposing unpopular taxes in the same period. To the extent that GDP growth allowed servicing national debt there was no problem. Since we do not have GDP data -a concept that will be created in the 20 th century -the Debt/GDP ratio that is central in current discussions on debt did not exist at the time. tend to think that it is less onerous to pay taxes to service debt in perpetuity than to pay the whole expenditure in a lump sum. He does not think improbable that capitalists will transfer their funds abroad if they are to stay in a country that will keep taxing them to pay for the interest of the public debt. He also thinks necessary to repay in peace time debt that has been assumed in order to finance war. In his parliamentary speeches he harbours no illusions about the creation of sinking funds which accumulate money to repay debts, but in reality end up as mechanisms to accumulate more debt.
In subsequent literature this conditional -theorem‖ by Ricardo regarding the equivalence between taxes and debt has been dubbed -Ricardian equivalence‖ by James Buchanan. 32 It is, of course, a misnomer since Ricardo never thought that the two were equivalent.
33
The term -Ricardian equivalence‖ and the subsequent discussion started in a totally different context in the 1970s when Robert Barro in his article in the Journal of Political Economy wanted to maintain the validity of the theorem even when tax payers might die before the debt is repaid. 34 Barro assumed that tax payers are altruistic and that they want to leave their inheritance to their descendants. Essentially, he turned them into infinitely lived agents, discussing the case of overlapping generation. His main purpose was to prove the par excellence anti-Keynesian position that fiscal expenditure has no impact since citizens discount the fact that tax will eventually be paid. James Buchanan, discussing Barro's paper notes Ricardo's contribution and coins the -theorem‖.
More cautious in the matter of debt is Ricardo's friend and rival Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 Malthus ( -1834 . His -effectual consumption‖ and the -doctrine of proportions‖ -i.e., the denial of Say's Law -a fact that made him so dear to John Maynard Keynes, makes him to see the role of non-productive workers at the service of rich people, soldiers, sailors, landowners and holders of public debt in a different perspective. It is they who subsist on taxes without producing themselves, but who create the necessary consumption so that the economy can achieve full employment.
Public debt helps their maintenance. On the other hand, Malthus innate conservatism makes him to see the disastrous results that a large public debt can bring about, which -at any rate -are less disastrous than those that Poor Laws can lead to, and proposes to examine the whole issue in such a manner as to find the golden mean so that the public debt is not increased. An increase in public debt must be financed by taxes which if they are exorbitant whey will affect adversely production, will lead to the devaluation of currency which is unfair to bondholders and, perish the thought, it might create the impression that the state is unable to honour its obligations which 33 Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr, -The Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem‖, Journal of Political Economy, 1977 , 85 (1), pp. 207-210, Willem Hendrik Buiter & James Tobin, -Debt Neutrality: A Brief Review of Doctrine and Evidence‖, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 497, 1978 , reprinted in George M. Von Furstenberg (ed.), Social Security versus Private Saving, Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing, 1979 , pp. 39-63, Lefteris Tsoulfidis, -Classical Economists and Public Debt‖, International Review of Economics, 2007 34 Robert J. Barro, -Are government bonds net wealth?‖, Journal of Political Economy, 1974 Economy, , 82 (6), pp. 1095 Economy, -1117 will cast a shadow of doubt on the credibility of the state and insecurity of those who have property. 35 John Stuart Mill's (1806 -1873 Whenever capital is withdrawn from production, or from the fund destined for production, to be lent to the State, and expended unproductively, that whole sum is withheld from the labouring classes: the loan, therefore, is in truth paid off the same year; the whole of the sacrifice necessary for paying it off is actually made: only it is paid to the wrong persons, and therefore does not extinguish the claim; and paid by the very worst of taxes, a tax exclusively on the labouring class. And after having, in this most painful and unjust way, gone through the whole effort necessary for extinguishing the debt, the country remains charged with it, and with the payment of its interest in perpetuity. Even more radical in his views on public debt was Abba P. Lerner with his theory of Functional Finance. 43 According to Lerner the size of the Public Debt in absolute or relative numbers is immaterial, as is the level of taxes and the money printed by the government. The only thing that matters is to maintain the level of the national income to the level of full capacity and full employment without inflation. The government should do whatever it takes to achieve this without caring about the existence of budget deficits or the size of the national debt. Anything else is immaterial and reflects the scholasticism of doctrines of bygone eras. Lerner's views proved to be too radical even for Keynes himself who condemned them in public.
The problem was not that Lerner's views were inconsistent with Keynesian theory.
They were logically sound within Keynes' theory and they were pushing the theory to its logical conclusions. Keynes feared that an increase in National Debt was not politically sustainable. At a certain point the Debt/GDP ratio will reach a level that would have created a confidence crisis for the government. James Buchanan lambasts what he calls the -new orthodoxy‖ regarding public debt. 45 The new macroeconomic theory is transformed into microeconomics in search of microfoundations and attempts to derive policy conclusion. In this brave new world, rational agents inter-temporally maximize their utility over infinite lives and their rationality is not fooled by debt-financed fiscal measures. Economies are in equilibrium, unless there is an external shock or governments interfere. Balanced budgets and low public debts are derived now as scientific results of the new theory which should be incorporated -away from the madding crowd of politics and the will of electorates -into the constitutions of countries. Even though the ability of these theories to account for the possibility of global crises has been proven miserably inadequate, the analysis of public debt in the new political economy has served as the servant of reactionary neoliberal policy vying for ideological hegemony. 
